The Backdrop: A Sudden Shift in Washington
In August 2024, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) quietly made a ruling that would reverberate through South Korea’s nuclear industry. During a closed-door meeting attended by officials from Seoul and Washington — including representatives of Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP), Korea Electric Power Corp. (KEPCO), and Westinghouse — the DOE concluded that Korea’s flagship APR1400 reactor contained “American-origin technology.”
This determination, made under the Biden administration, meant that South Korea’s nuclear exports would now be subject to U.S. export control. The decision came just weeks after KHNP had been named the preferred bidder for a multi-billion-dollar Czech nuclear project — and effectively stripped Korea of its ability to export reactors independently.
From Independence to Oversight
For years, Seoul had argued that the APR1400 was the product of independent Korean engineering — an evolution of earlier designs, yes, but now fully its own. The DOE ruling rejected that narrative, citing verification work by the Argonne National Laboratory that traced technical lineage back to Westinghouse.
The timing was pivotal. With a March 2025 contract deadline looming for the Czech project, KHNP’s leverage weakened overnight. The U.S. decision made it nearly impossible for Korea to proceed without Washington’s approval — or without Westinghouse’s formal cooperation.
The Settlement: Costly and Constraining
In January 2025, KHNP and KEPCO signed a sweeping 50-year agreement with Westinghouse. Under the deal, Korea agreed to purchase more than 1 trillion won (about US$730 million) worth of goods and services for each exported reactor, pay royalties, and limit its ability to enter advanced markets alone.
Industry insiders described the settlement as a “forced compromise,” shaped by the reality that without U.S. cooperation, Korean exports would face regulatory blockades worldwide.
“It was a situation where export control became a weapon,” one industry official told Korea Bizwire. “Without Washington’s approval, there was no path forward.”
Diplomatic Calculus: Avoiding a Collision Course
Behind the scenes, Seoul faced an uncomfortable choice: challenge Washington’s decision — or adapt to it. As the U.S. prepared for a second Trump administration, Korean policymakers decided it was better to secure a cooperative framework than risk confrontation.
On January 8, just days before the Westinghouse settlement was finalized, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy and the U.S. DOE signed a new bilateral accord — the KORUS Nuclear Export and Cooperation Principles Agreement. The deal reaffirmed nonproliferation commitments while encouraging “Team KORUS” cooperation in global nuclear markets.
In essence, Seoul conceded U.S. technological primacy in exchange for preserving strategic collaboration.
Political Fallout at Home
The agreement has since become a flashpoint in domestic politics. The ruling Democratic Party has labeled it a “humiliating settlement” that compromised Korea’s technological sovereignty. Lawmakers argue that the previous administration concealed the DOE’s 2024 decision from the public while presenting a “rosy outlook” on the Czech deal.
Rep. Heo Sung-moo, who uncovered the internal documents, called the DOE’s ruling “the core event of this unfair accord,” vowing to reveal whether former President Yoon Suk Yeol or his aides ordered it suppressed.
The current administration has opted for pragmatism. Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan told the National Assembly this month, “Every contract has its trade-offs. Despite its flaws, this agreement is part of our long export history.”
The Bigger Picture: A Question of Nuclear Sovereignty
At its heart, the controversy underscores the limits of technological autonomy in an era where nuclear exports are governed by overlapping regimes of regulation, diplomacy, and security.
Korea’s bid to become a global nuclear supplier — once a symbol of industrial independence — now faces a new reality: one where cooperation with the United States is both a constraint and a necessity.
As the two allies prepare to expand joint ventures under the “Team KORUS” banner, Seoul’s nuclear industry must navigate a fine line between partnership and dependency — balancing national ambition with geopolitical pragmatism.
M. H. Lee (mhlee@koreabizwire.com)
